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Abstract: 
Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after 
being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the 
effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term 
growth and long-run output effects in both 1880-1913 and 1973-2003 for 45 countries. Greater 
ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt is associated with increased risks of currency and debt 
crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country’s reserve 
base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign 
currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our 
findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern 
Europe.  
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Foreign currency liabilities are often perceived as a financial weakness in 
emerging markets. It is widely believed that these debts exacerbated the severity of the 
Mexican tequila crisis (1994), Russian ruble crisis (1998) and East Asian crisis in late 
1990s (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). As a result, unhedged exposure to debts 
denominated in foreign currency have substantially diminished. Instead, borrowing 
governments tend to issue local-currency denominated debt on international markets 
while lenders increasingly participate in domestic bond markets (Burger and Warnock, 
2006 ).
1 Improved liquidity and depth have expanded the development of local financial 
markets, and the accumulation of reserves, especially in East Asia, has offered significant 
insurance against potential future instability. 
Nonetheless, foreign currency debt contracts and their potential financial risks 
have not been eliminated. Exchange rate policy is crucial for managing these debts. Soft 
pegs, carrying implicit guarantees for exchange rate stability, could lead to complacency 
and ‘excessive’ borrowing in foreign currency. Recommendations for reforming 
exchange rate policy to reduce these risks after the East Asian crisis have focused on two 
options. First, free-floating exchange rates would help diminish incentives to borrow in 
foreign currency, and second, monetary unions could eliminate currency mismatches 
altogether.  
Despite progress in implementing these exchange rate reforms in East Asia, some 
countries have been slower to reform (especially eastern Europe), and the global financial 
crisis of 2008 has exposed financial weaknesses. Thus far large reserves have helped 
maintain stability in East Asia. However, the situation facing countries in eastern Europe, 
particularly the Baltic states, which established pegged exchange rates of intermediate 
hardness post-1997 and built up significant proportions of private debt and other 
                                                 
1 The GEMLOC project launched in 2008 at the World Bank’s IFC aims to track the investibility in 
domestic local currency denominated asset markets and to support these markets. They report that as of 
2008 70 percent of emerging market debt was denominated in local currency debt.  3  
liabilities payable in euro, dollars and Swiss francs, is widely regarded to be a ‘perfect 
storm’.
2 
Can financial stability be maintained in these countries despite high proportions 
of foreign currency debt? Are there other vulnerabilities besides foreign currency debt? 
Our analysis based on the experience of over 1,700 country years spanning two periods 
of open international financial integration, 1880 to 1913 and 1973 to 2003, suggests the 
answers may be affirmative on both accounts.
 3 Despite such conclusions, foreign 
currency debt, combined with other financial weaknesses remain a vulnerability. 
We first investigate the empirical relationship between financial crises and foreign 
currency debt, economic growth and output.  All else equal, we find robust evidence that 
foreign currency debt increases the likelihood of currency and debt crises. The risks of 
crisis are the greatest when borrowing in foreign currency is rapid and large, banking 
systems are prone to crisis, and international reserves are low.
4 Currency and debt crises 
lead to significant short term losses in economic growth and to permanent output losses.  
We highlight the following additional points:  
1) Risk of a crisis can be small even when liabilities are payable in hard currency 
if financial systems are solid and countries have good reputations in international capital 
markets. This implies that intermediate pegs can be a viable strategy 
2) Minimizing foreign currency financing is not a sufficient condition to eliminate 
financial crises.  
 
 
2 Foreign Currency Financing in Two Periods of Globalization: Policy, Observations and 
Implications 
 
2.1 Policy and International Financial Architecture with Foreign Currency Debt 
 
                                                 
2 Amongst many others see Gros (2009) Gligorov and Landesmann (2009) or Stokes (2009).  
3 Goldstein and Turner (2004) call attention to the mismatch issue. A currency mismatch is measured as the 
value of foreign currency obligations relative to foreign currency assets and streams of revenues. Financial 
development and prudent borrowing are other routes to avoiding these costs as we will illustrate. 
4 Other forms of insurance besides reserve accumulation may be less costly and just as effective, but we do 
not control explicitly for these below.  4  
Close analysis of the East Asian and Latin American crises of the 1990s led 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) to conclude that external borrowing in foreign 
currency was a major reason for the severity of these financial crises. In several South 
East Asian countries and Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001/2002 pegged exchange 
rates provided an implicit guarantee of exchange rate stability. Households, domestic 
banks, and non-financial firms built up significant short-term debt denominated in US 
dollars. Many local banks also borrowed short in dollars and lent long into the domestic 
economy, expecting payments in local currency,.  
Those borrowers involved seemed to dismiss, ignore or discount the possibility 
that dollar liabilities might increase due to a sharp depreciation. They also appear to have 
overestimated the capacity or willingness of their governments to maintain fixed 
exchange rates. Yet repeatedly after 1990 in Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Russia and Argentina, among many others, governments failed to uphold these 
pegs against sudden stops to capital inflows. This wreaked havoc on the balance sheets of 
domestic financial and non-financial firms, leading to successive credit crunches and 
output losses.  
Many policy prescriptions emerged from this era of financial turbulence, with a 
few key options for mitigating risks associated with foreign currency debt. One option 
involved enhancing or initiating local currency markets. It was argued that as liquidity 
rose foreign participation in these markets would increase enabling LDCs to tap surplus 
country wealth but with local currency debt. Another option was to self-insure through 
accumulating reserves, an option taken by many of the East Asian counties. However, 
such policies limited net capital inflows and unsustainable net foreign asset positions. 
A related pair of options involved reforming exchange rate policies. A free float 
would discourage the policy-induced moral hazard thought to be at play in the 1990s 
(Eichengreen, 2002), and develop markets for domestic debt. There is no doubt that 
expanding domestic debt markets has alleviated some of the seemingly excess reliance on 
foreign currency debt. However, having floating exchange rates is a less viable option for 
most small open developing economies (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). The second option 
was for the country to get rid of the exchange rate altogether, instead establishing hard 
peg currency boards or monetary unions. Unfortunately, abolishing exchange rates is a a  5  
politically risky strategy. As Argentina’s experience showed, when an economy is 
vulnerable to shocks and lacks the capacity to make necessary quick adjustments, ‘ultra-
credible’ currency policies can change suddenly. Thus, forming monetary unions, as in 
Europe, was the remaining option. So far, relatively few countries in the world have 
taken the option to ‘dollarize’ or ‘euroize’. The European Monetary Union (EMU) is 
expanding eastwards but only slowly. Still, there the 2008-09 financial crisis has 
revitalized interest in joining EMU. Still there are observers who are betting that 
membership in the EMU may not be permanent, especially for the members with the the 
largest imbalances or those who face other political challenges (Feldstein, 2009).  
 
2.2 The Origins of Foreign Currency Debt 
 
Foreign debt has historically been denominated in only a handful of key 
currencies like the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the British pound sterling, or the German 
mark. A high ratio of foreign currency liabilities to total international liabilities was 
called ‘original sin’ by Eichengreen and Hausmann because the currency denomination 
aspect of the contract was ostensibly unrelated to fundamentals.  Rich and poor countries, 
institutionally weak nations, and even countries with strong property rights issue much, 
or all, of their debt on international markets in foreign currency (Flandreau and Sussman 
2005 and Bordo and Meissner 2007a). 
As it turns out, domestically issued liabilities have historically carried indexation 
or foreign currency clauses. The assumption that the international market is the only one 
of interest is misplaced. Exchange rate indexation clauses in domestic debt can generate 
distributional consequences when the exchange rate depreciates or inflation rises. These 
matter whenever capital market imperfections exist, as detailed in long-run evidence of 
Bordo and Meissner (2006, 2007a). In the rest of our study, we look at total, not just 
international, debt outstanding whenever possible. 
Before 1914, in the first wave of financial globalization, most countries financed 
themselves with foreign currency debt. Like today, most debt issued in external markets 
(e.g., London, Paris, and Berlin) was denominated in the currency of the financial  6  
leaders. Private and sovereign debt contracts often demanded repayment in a fixed weight 
of precious metal such as gold.  
However this was by no means the rule within this period. Many emerging 
markets managed to place significant amounts of long term debt payable in local 
currency; and although the ‘emerging’ countries were commonly regarded as possessing 
underdeveloped or weak financial systems and dubious institutional foundations they still 
managed to have significant amounts of domestic currency debt.
5 Foreign investors were 
not always shy of holding such debt in their portfolios (Flandreau and Sussman, 2005). 
These countries included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, Russia, Spain, Portugal. By 
contrast, other countries maintained heavy exposure to hard currency debt. These were 
the countries that would eventually become mature industrialized economies, and which 
were already leaders in terms of the quality of their institutions, their financial 
development, their protection of creditors, and the degree of structural change. These 
markets included the Australasian colonies, Canada, the United States, and Scandinavia.
6  
For this paper we rely on high quality data on the currency denomination of total 
public debt for 18 countries prior to 1914. These include bonds issued both domestically 
and externally, and in some respects these data have better coverage than current data 
which have been used to explore the question.
7  For the recent past (1973-2003) we rely 
on data for internationally issued obligations only. 
New evidence from the recent decades of financial integration also shows that 
developing country governments are quite able to market substantial proportions of their 
total debt in local currency (Burger and Warnock, 2006 and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
It appears also that foreign investors may be increasingly willing to hold developing 
country local currency debt.  
These facts and the history of capital flows in the 1990s lead to the following 
questions: Are countries with the lowest exchange rate exposure guaranteed the most 
financial stability? Are their other necessary factors which need to accompany a break 
away from foreign currency debt to ensure financial stability? Can countries manage 
                                                 
5 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) reach a similar conclusion. 
6 Debt was often denominated in dollars in the United States in the nineteenth century. But nearly all debt 
(corporate, sovereign, state and municipal) had a gold clause which meant repayment in a fixed quantity of 
gold was expected. 
7 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) have also improved the twentieth century data for domestic debt.  7  
foreign currency debt with alternative financial development strategies? Is foreign 
currency debt imposed by financial markets on the countries that are expected to perform 
poorly or is such debt generally endemic to most debt issues on global capital markets? 
 
 
2.3 Original Sin? A Long Run View Of Hard Currency Debt’s Consequences and Origins 
 
Theoretical models are generally ambiguous about the effect of exchange rate 
depreciation when foreign currency debt is present. In sticky price macroeconomic 
models, nominal depreciation in the face of hard currency debt is likely to be 
contractionary as debt repayments increase.
8 This traditional view is that the 
expansionary effect of depreciation on increased exports and decreased imports can offset 
this impact.  
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) study an open economy IS-LM model with 
capital market frictions and find that the net impact of a surprise devaluation on income 
depends on  the degree of capital market imperfections, the share of home goods in total 
consumption, the fraction of total debt denominated in hard currency and the ratio of debt 
to net worth. Krugman (1999) and Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2000) also derive 
conditions under which real depreciation can be contractionary.  
 Jeanne (2000) argues that when foreign currency debt solves a moral hazard 
problem it may be an efficient solution, but when there is adverse selection it is sub-
optimal. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) show that when there is financial under-
development agents opt for inefficiently high levels of foreign currency debt. The 
theoretical ambiguity in the predicted effects and rationale for foreign currency debt 
stands in stark contrast to the policy paradigm developed after 1997 and a general 
tendency to applaud minimizing foreign currency debt.  
What does the empirical work show? Previous work in a long-run comparative 
vein (e.g., Bordo and Meissner, 2006) finds that foreign currency debt alone does not 
always generate a higher likelihood of a financial crisis.
9 Several countries like Canada, 
                                                 
8 Similar outcomes are possible in real models with tradable and not-tradable sectors. 
9 This paper uses information on public debt only.   8  
the US, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries in the nineteenth century, did not have 
severe financial instability or debt defaults even with significant foreign currency 
liabilities relative to their total obligations; on the other hand, many countries with low to 
intermediate ratios of hard currency debt to total debt did have frequent and severe 
financial crises.  
In the late twentieth century, our research documents that many advanced 
countries exhibited significant amounts of hard currency debt outstanding relative to their 
total external debt liabilities, but most have avoided being plagued by severe crises. On 
the other hand, emerging markets which also had a high percentage of their external debt 
denominated in foreign currency were highly susceptible to debt crises and had high 
financial instability. Bebczuk, Galindo and Panizza (2006) find that foreign currency debt 
is directly associated with lower growth rates when the real exchange rate depreciates. 
Arteta (2003) uses data on currency denomination of deposits and private sector credit 
and finds that dollarized banking systems are not significantly more prone to crises. 
Bleakley and Cowan (2008), in a sample of Latin American countries, found no evidence 
that firms’ investment decisions are affected by hard currency debt even in the face of 
depreciation.  
The lesson appears to be that sound debt management at the micro or macro level, 
financial development, and sustainable fiscal positions have allowed countries to escape 
financial turmoil even in the presence of a high percentage of debt denominated in 
foreign currency. Financial development includes many aspects, amongst them are: 
increasing the attractiveness of holding the domestic currency abroad, deepening liquidity 
in local financial markets, sound and credible government finances and strong financial 
intermediation services. Reserve accumulation and strong export capacity can also help 
avoid the volatility associated with foreign currency debt. Thus, even if countries have 
not yet developed the foundations of good finances, they can minimize instability by 
limiting their currency mismatches. This does not imply, however, that only countries 
with weak finances end up with foreign currency debt, as shown clearly in Eichengreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2005). 
  9  
3 International Financial Flows, Hard Currency Debt, Crises and Economic Growth: A 
Brief Conceptual Framework 
 
Our framework for the empirical analysis is designed to evaluate the associations 
of foreign currency debt with financial crises and, indirectly, with economic growth. 
Following the approach of Mishkin (2003) and Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2005),
10  our 
analysis integrates a balance sheet view of the credit channel transmission mechanism 
with the open-economy. In this framework, balance sheets, net worth and informational 
asymmetries are key ingredients, as is the development of the financial system.  
Based on our review of the literature, the basic framework for an emerging market 
suggests the following (also see Figure 1): 
•  Sudden stops or reversals in capital inflows are more likely when the 
capital account is liberalized or a country receives a surge in capital 
inflows. The likelihood of a sudden stop is exacerbated by high levels of 
foreign currency debt relative to total borrowing and low levels of 
internationally tradable production relative to total output.
11 
•  Large capital inflows, sudden stops and current account turnarounds are 
often subsequently associated with a speculative attack on the currency or 
sharp currency drops. Currency crises are especially likely when policy 
makers have low credibility or low reserve positions. If foreign currency 
exposure is heavy, expectations that debt might not be repaid in the case of 
a depreciation may lead to a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis and a credit 
crunch. 
•  All else equal, foreign currency debt exposure in the face of a sudden and 
large depreciation of the exchange rate makes private and public debt 
default more likely. Private agents’ balance sheets are impaired. A credit 
crunch based on widespread insolvencies ensues. The economy sinks 
deeper into recession and revenues fall giving rise to a further round of 
                                                 
10 Mishkin’s informal analysis follows a stream of literature from the late 1990s on the links between net 
worth, exchange rate depreciation, and crises. 
11 Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) and Bordo, Cavallo and Meissner (2008) find direct empirical 
evidence for this proposition.   10 
disintermediation and so forth. Governments and private agents become 
more likely to default in such a scenario. Growth is slow until the financial 
system is repaired and investment recovers. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
4 Empirical Evidence: The Potential Costs of Hard Currency Debt 
 
The goal of this section is to provide a rough test of the logic proposed above.  
These empirical tests then provide a gateway for measuring the impact of hard currency 
debt on economic growth via its impact on crises. We present evidence that large capital 
inflows have often contributed to the likelihood of a currency crisis. These sharp and 
sudden depreciations were also likely to give way to debt crises when foreign currency 
debt was a significant percentage of the outstanding total and other pre-existing 
weaknesses were present.  A higher propensity to have a crisis depends on these other 
controls that proxy for financial development and management.  
This is the crux of our evidence that hard currency debt alone is not to blame for 
financial crises. Hard currency debt, combined with good financial development, is 
associated with a relatively low propensity to experience debt crises in both periods of 
globalization. Strong financial development limits the probability of a currency crisis and 
the likelihood of a default in the event of a sharp currency drop.  
On the other hand, when other weaknesses in fundamentals are present, even 
relatively low exposure to foreign currency debt with a sharply depreciating exchange 
rate is associated with a substantial risk of a crisis. Decreasing dependence on foreign 
currency debt may not be sufficient to lead to financial stability. 
We then focus on the economic costs of hard currency debt. We discuss how 
original sin and poor financial development together are often indirectly associated with 
temporarily lower economic growth and negative level effects on income because they 
hasten financial crises. These factors combined appear to contribute to significantly lower 
standards of living in countries relying on foreign currency denominated capital inflows 
to spur development.  11 
 
 
4.1  The Association between Foreign Capital Inflows and Financial Crises 
 
The first step in testing the above framework is to see whether foreign capital 
flows are associated with greater risks of currency crises. We hold constant several 
factors identified as significant by previous research.
12 We control for international and 
year-specific factors using the short term discount rate at the Bank of England (1880-
1913) and later the yield on short-term US treasury bills (1973-2003). We also condition 
on the lagged level of the ratio of net capital inflows to GDP measured as the (negative) 
of the change in the ratio of the net international investment position to GDP, the ratio of 
hard currency government debt outstanding to total government debt (1880 - 1913) or the 
within country average ratio of foreign currency debt to total debt issued on international 
markets (this is based on the Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza data covering 1973-
1992).
13,14 Following Eichengreen and colleagues, we call the latter variable original sin.  
The ratio of gold reserves to monetary notes in circulation (1880-1913) or foreign 
currency reserves to the money supply (1973-2003), and the presence of a banking crisis 
in the previous year are also included. 
In column 1 and 4 of Table 1, we estimate a probit model where the dependent 
variable is one if there was a currency crisis and zero otherwise.
15 Column 1 is for the 
                                                 
12 Previous work (e.g., Bordo and Meissner, 2006) has used other determinants. Many of these are not 
significantly associated with crises in probit estimations hence we exclude them. All data used in the 
following exercises are described in the data appendix. 
 
13 The Eichengreen et. al. average based on data from 1973-1992 is then used for the years beyond 1992 
under the assumption that the ratio does not change much over time. The available data for 1972-1992 
suggest this variable is very persistent. Comparable data have not been compiled systematically for the 
1993-2003 period to the best of our knowledge. Data from the Bondware data series exist but these data do 
not extend backwards far enough and the coverage of the liabilities is different. Results below appear stable 
when restricting the sample to 1973-1992 and letting the original sin variable vary by year. Again, this is 
true because the original sin variable is highly persistent. 
 
14 The composition of capital flows (portfolio equity or debt or FDI) may matter for crisis probabilities. 
Ultimately we proceed to growth regressions with all capital inflows which what much of the literature on 
growth and capital flows in the last five years has analyzed. 
 
15 Currency crises are defined using an exchange market pressure index as in Bordo et. al. See the  
appendix for details.  12 
period 1880-1913 and covers the experience of 18 countries listed below Table 1 while 
column 4 covers 45 listed countries between 1973 and 2003. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 1 
show that a large inflow of capital relative to GDP has a positive association with 
currency crises—this marginal effect is statistically significant at the 95 percent level pre-
1913 and the 90 percent level post-1973. The coefficient on the ‘original sin’ variable is 
not statistically significant in the first period, but it is positive and statistically significant 
in the second period. Higher interest rates in the financial centers are associated with a 
higher chance of a currency crisis. Lower levels of reserves predict higher probabilities of 
a currency crash in both periods, but this result is only statistically significant in the first 
period.  Finally, between 1973 and 2003 there is some evidence that a banking crisis in 
the previous year is associated with crises in the current year.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2 Debt Crises and Hard Currency Debt 
 
The next link in our framework in Figure 1 relates currency depreciation, liability 
“dollarization” and the other fundamentals to debt default. Results from a pair of probit 
models are shown (column 2 and column 5 in Table 1) which use an indicator for the first 
year in which a country defaulted (partially or in whole) on its sovereign debt obligations 
as a dependent variable. Here we also find evidence consistent with our framework.  
First we see that the marginal impact of a higher ratio of hard currency debt to 
total debt outstanding, without a currency crash,  is associated with a higher probability 
of having a debt crisis only after 1972 (Columns 2 and 5 of Table 1).  In both periods, 
having a currency crisis amplifies the positive association between hard currency debt 
and a debt default. We illustrate the impact on predicted probabilities below in Table 2. 
The interpretation is that real depreciation increases the real burden of foreign currency 
debt making default more likely.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 The following conclusions can be made based on these regressions: foreign 
currency debt is likely to be associated with debt crises after large foreign capital inflows.  13 
Such inflows would be associated with significantly increased external debt burdens, and 
these are seen in column 1 and 4 to heighten the possibility of a currency crisis. The 
interaction in columns 2 and 5 of Table 1 of the hard currency debt ratio and the currency 
crisis indicator shows these inflows limit the “sustainability” of a high ratio of hard 
currency debt outstanding to total debt.  
In terms of proxies for financial development, we have several findings. First, a  
banking crisis in the previous year is a positive and statistically significant determinant of 
debt crises.
16 Low reserves relative to the money stock are also related to a higher 
likelihood of having a debt crisis, but in neither period is this coefficient statistically 
significant.
17 We find strong support that original sin and balance sheets matter, but we 
also find evidence that strong financial systems are important for explaining the (lack of) 
incidence of major financial meltdowns. 
 
4.3 Interactions between Fundamentals and Hard Currency Debt on the Likelihood of a 
Debt Crisis 
 
In Table 2 we illustrate the impact of hard currency debt ratios on predicted probabilities 
of debt crises. We also probe into the interactions between hard currency debt and other 
fundamentals. Table 2 presents predicted probabilities of a crisis using the estimated 
coefficients from the models of Table 1, a 100 percent hard currency debt ratio and a 
range of values for the other included covariates which are associated with financial 
development and financial robustness.  These results indicate that the fragility induced by 
hard currency debt can be overcome to some extent with better fundamentals. 
We define the following fundamental conditions:  “excellent fundamentals” as an 
observation with the sample average reserve to money stock ratio, no banking crisis in 
the previous year, and no currency crisis this year; “good fundamentals” as a country that 
has “excellent fundamentals” but falls victim to a currency crisis; “bad fundamentals” has 
a banking crisis in the previous year and no international reserves; and finally the “worst 
                                                 
16 Banking crises could also be endogenous to financial turmoil as balance sheets implode. Such fragility 
however suggests weak regulatory regimes or vulnerabilities in the first place. 
17 Currency crises are associated with a lower likelihood of a debt crisis in the second period until the ratio 
of hard currency liabilities is sufficiently high.  14 
fundamentals” situation occurs with no reserves and a twin banking and currency crisis. 
Across all scenarios we set the level of net capital inflows and the short-term interest rate 
at the sample mean. 
 
The following conclusions are evident from Table 2: 
 
1) Scenario 1 “Excellent fundamentals” shows that a 100 percent hard currency 
debt to total debt ratio is associated with a small likelihood of a debt crisis in both 
periods.  
 
2) Scenarios 2 and 4, which allow for currency crises, demonstrate that 
depreciation with hard currency liabilities significantly raises the predicted likelihood of 
having a debt crisis above that of scenario 1. This is the case both for countries with good 
fundamentals and bad fundamentals.  The predicted probability of a debt crisis in the 
recent period is 0.18 or 0.63 in the earlier period with the “worst fundamentals”. Having 
strong reserves and no banking crisis reduces these probabilities by 2/3 as seen in 
Scenario 2. 
 
3) Scenario 3 shows that avoiding currency crises is crucial. Even with weak 
fundamentals and 100% of debt denominated in foreign currency, the predicted 
probability of a debt crisis is roughly 0.08 post 1972.   
 
3) A 100 percent ratio of hard currency debt relative to total debt (or international 
debt post-1972), combined with a move from the best to the worst fundamentals (a move 
from scenario 1 to scenario 4), raises the predicted probability of suffering a debt crisis 
by over 70 times in the first period and nearly six fold in the second period.  
 
4.4 Robustness of Crisis Determinants 
  
  In this section, we test whether our crisis models are robust to several potential 
data limitations and alternative explanations, including possible endogeneity of the  15 
foreign currency debt variable (e.g., worst countries borrow more in foreign currency) 
and the robustness to the sample (i.e., the G-7 could be driving the positive relationship 
between crises and foreign currency debt).   
In terms of endogeneity, the proportion of foreign currency debt could depend on 
unobservable factors that are associated with risks of crisis. One possibility is that 
choosing to borrow in foreign currency is positively related to other factors which 
heighten the likelihood of crises, such as moral hazard. If moral hazard is a key issue, 
then creditors may demand that countries borrow in hard currency so as not to ‘inflate 
away’ their debt. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) argued that original sin was a 
symptom of deeper flaws in the ability to repay debt. On the other hand, as discussed 
above, the origins of foreign currency debt also seem to involve market issues such as 
liquidity. Small countries in Scandinavia, and even the US until 1933, suffered from 
original sin while in Tsarist Russia, a country not known for its international reputation 
for solid monetary affairs, had a significant amount of rouble debt held in London 
(Flandreau and Sussman 2005). 
  We attempt to control for potential endogeneity using the size of an economy, 
measured as the logarithm of GDP, as an excluded instrumental variable. Economic size 
is mostly related to geography, geopolitics and military factors over the centuries, and it 
is likely to be uncorrelated with current unobservables such as debt sustainability or 
exchange rate peg credibility. Still, size is correlated with original sin. Eichenegreen, 
Hausmann and Panizza (2006) observed that size was about the only thing that could 
explain variations in original sin during the recent period. This observation seems to fit 
the facts with Russia in the nineteenth century as well (Flandreau and Sussman, 2005). 
  Table 3 reports results from one-step maximum likelihood instrumental variable 
probit regressions, parallel to those in Table 1.
18 The results for both the currency and 
debt crisis specifications in the first wave suggest no statistically significant relationship 
with crises. However, a Wald test for the first wave of globalization suggests we cannot 
rule out the exogeneity of the foreign currency debt ratio in either specification. This is 
                                                 
18 We are unable to include an interaction between original sin and currency crises in the debt crises 
models. Using the interaction of a currency crisis and the hard currency debt ratio made estimation 
unfeasible. Still since the probit models carry a non-linearity in their marginal effects one can see evidence 
of interaction between original sin and depreciation.  16 
not wholly at odds with the historical empirical observations about the origins of original 
sin. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
  
In the second period, the coefficient on original sin in the currency crisis model is 
positive, small but not statistically significant. This suggests that our finding of a positive 
statistically significant coefficient in Table 1 was due to endogeneity. On the other hand, 
in the probit model for debt crises, we find a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. It was not feasible to test directly for an interaction between currency crises 
and original sin in the debt crisis model as in Table 1. However, the coefficient on the 
control for a currency crisis is large, positive and statistically significant, so the marginal 
impact of the original sin variable would become stronger in the face of a currency 
crisis.
19 In both specifications post-1972, we reject the exogeneity of the original sin 
variable. Our bottom line is that endogeneity may be a cause for concern in currency 
crises since expected currency depreciation may naturally lead to hesitancy of creditors to 
lend in local currency. Still, once we control for these factors in the debt crisis model 
with a currency crisis indicator, it appears that original sin can heighten the probability 
itself of a debt crisis.  
  We also test robustness to the sample.
20 In Table 4 we drop G7 countries plus 
Switzerland. This leaves plenty of advanced but small countries with high levels of 
original sin but drops almost the universe of countries in the world that have the lowest 
levels or original sin.
21 This results in a lack of variance in the original sin variable, and it 
is perhaps one reason that column 1 (currency crises) and column 2 (debt crises)  show no 
statistically significant relationship between such crises and original sin. Once we 
instrument for original sin as before, we find an unintuitive negative and statistically 
                                                 
19 This is due to the non-linearity of the probit model.  
20 Prior to the late 1980s private capital flows to many emerging markets were low and mainly from official 
sources. Unreported probits for a sample that begins in 1988 finds qualitatively similar results to those 
reported in Table 1. 
21 The data show that only nine countries are below 90 percent and above 47 percent (Portugal, Australia, 
Spain, New Zealand, Netherlands, South Africa, Hong Kong, Denmark, Belgium). Austria is the next 
lowest at 90 percent followed by 11 countries with ratios of  93 to 99.7. The next 16 countries have 100 
percent ratios.   17 
significant coefficient on original sin for currency crises and a positive statistically 
significant coefficient on original sin for debt crises. In the latter case, we cannot reject 
the exogeneity of original sin. Our bottom line here is that plenty of advanced countries 
‘suffer’ from original sin but they manage to avoid crises that are related to variables for 
which we do not or cannot control. Weaker or  ‘less credible’ countries have difficulty 
carrying such debt.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5 Economic Growth, Output and International Capital Flows 
 
5.1  Foreign Currency Debt, Financial Crises, and Economic Growth  
 
We have now established that a high proportion of debt in foreign currency can 
under certain circumstances be associated with a greater risk of financial crisis. In this 
section, we examine whether such forms of debt have an impact on per capita output via 
financial crises. This chain of logic will allow for a measure of the growth and output 
losses implied by foreign currency liabilities via their impact on crises. 
We follow closely Bordo and Meissner (2007b) who investigate the relation 
between financial flows and growth and Loayza and Ranciere (2005) who investigate 
financial liberalization and growth in the short and long-run.
22 Specifically we first 
present a series of cross-country growth regressions for five-year periods which include 
as key explanatory variables net capital inflows and episodes of financial crisis. By 
including financial crises we can recursively track the impact on growth of hard currency 
debt via the crisis variable. Our second set of results uses annual data to look at long and 
short-run impacts on output of capital flows and financial crises. 
 
 
5.2 Multivariate Growth Regressions: Tracking the Growth costs of Liability 
Dollarization 
                                                 
22 Ranciere, Tornell and Westerman (2006) also examine the short and long run impacts of financial 
liberalization    18 
 
We explore growth in real per capita GDP in non-overlapping five year periods 
for the sample 1880-1913 and then for the 1973-2003 sample. Between 1880 and 1913 
we use a set of twelve countries for which we have savings data and then a set 19 
countries (the same twelve as before plus seven other countries) when we drop the 
savings variable from our regressions.
23 For the period 1973-2003 we look at the 
experience of 49 countries. 
Our key control variables are the level of net capital inflows/GDP and the average 
number of years that witnessed a financial crisis during the five year period.
24  Based on 
evidence from our probit models above, hard currency debt--the focus of this study—is a 
key determinant of crises. If so, then such variables may have an indirect effect on 
growth.  
To capture the direct impact of global capital market integration, we used the 
average of the ratio of the net capital inflows to GDP in the five year period. Of course, in 
an open economy, investment is the sum of two components: net foreign borrowing and 
net national saving. Hence we also include the five year average of the ratio of domestic 
savings to GDP.
25  
The other explanatory variables are standard and based on Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992) and later papers that study economic growth empirically. We include the 
following controls in Table 5: the logarithm of GDP per capita in the initial year of the 
five year period, the five year average of the population growth rate, the five year average 
of the percentage of the population enrolled in primary school, and the level of exports 
divided by GDP or imports plus exports divided by GDP in the latter period. 
                                                 
23 The set of twelve countries includes: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United States. The sample of 19 adds in Austria, Brazil, Egypt, India, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Uruguay.  
24 We take the sum of indicators for the first years of a currency, debt or banking crises during a five year 
period and average this value within the five-year period. Multiple types of crises in one year are counted 
as one event. 
25 Where we do include savings, we do not adjust the savings variable downward for countries with capital 
outflows because the main capital suppliers are already excluded form the data set. Also the current account 
data are not directly comparable with the Stone data which would make a proper adjustment difficult. Data 
on saving are from Taylor (2002) who calculated the ratio of saving to GDP as the current account surplus 
divided by GDP plus the ratio of investment to GDP. We also used the investment ratio instead of 
borrowing and domestic saving and found that the investment ratio was not statistically significant in the 
growth regressions.  19 
 






where all variables are averaged over non-overlapping five year periods themselves 
indexed by t, Growth is the average annual growth of real per capita output, Δ 
ln(population) represents the (five-year average) of the annual log differences in 
population levels, the 0 subscript on GDP per capita stands for the initial year of the five 
year period, μi  is a set of country “fixed effects,” δ is a vector of quinquennial period 
indicators, and ε is an idiosyncratic error term for each country within each five year 
period.
26  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
In columns I to IV of Table 5, we present results from regressions of the growth 
equation above for 1880-1913 and 1973-2003. Columns I and III leave out national 
saving which slightly expands the sample in the first wave of globalization.  
The results on the standard growth controls (especially initial GDP and schooling) 
are in line with expectations from the rest of the empirical growth literature. Domestic 
saving is positive and statistically significant only in the second period. School enrolment 
and trade exposure are positively related to growth in both periods. Initial GDP has a 
negative coefficient and it is statistically significant implying conditional convergence; 
population growth rates are not statistically significant. 
Turning to our results on capital flows, we find no evidence of any association 
between international capital inflows and economic growth. The coefficient on net capital 
inflows is never statistically significant. It does appear that the inflows variable is 
negatively correlated with savings since when savings is omitted the point estimate of 
                                                 
26 We correct the standard errors for heteroscedasticity by using robust standard errors. We also cluster 
these at the country level. 
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(1)  20 
this variable is negative. When savings is included, the point estimate on inflows 
becomes positive.  
The weight of the evidence from Table 5 is that periods plagued by crises are bad 
for growth within the five year periods in which they occur. The point estimate of the 
coefficient for the average number of years in the five year period spent in crisis suggests 
average growth falls by one to two percentage points during crises. The average annual 
growth rate is 1.73 suggesting a loss of at least a full year’s growth for one year crisis 
events. Crises represent significant temporary negative shocks to growth which are likely 
to have a long-run negative level effect on income per capita.
27  
 
5.3 Long and Short-run Output Effects of Capital Flows and Crises 
 
  The preceding specifications did not look at whether crises have a permanent or 
transitory impact on output per capita. Our results suggest that crises leave economies at 
lower levels of output in each and every year after a crises, but Calvo, Izquierdo and 
Talvi (2006) argued that economies suffering sudden stops and crises recovered quickly 
making phoenix comebacks. This was evinced by showing nations reached pre-crisis 
output levels within 2 or three years of an event which ignores that, absent a crisis, output 
would have been even higher. Also Loayza and Ranciere (2005) and Ranciere and 
Tornell (2009) analyze empirically and theoretically (respectively) short and long-run 
impacts of financial liberalization and economic growth.
28 Liberalization often yields 
more volatile growth but also offers faster growth than staying closed. We investigate 
whether financial flows in both periods of globalization have permanent or short-run 
impacts on the level of output per capita and whether crises have a similar impact.   
  Specifically Table 6 implements an ARDL (p, q) fixed effects panel regression in 
error correction form. We look at both short-run changes in output per capita and long-
run determinants of output per capita so our model is in error correction form. Our 
estimating equation is 
                                                 
27 Further unreported growth regressions show that lagged crisis indicators are not associated with above-
average growth rates. There is little evidence of phoenix miracle recovery. 
28 In Ranciere and Tornell, and Westermann (2008) countries with more negative skewness of credit growth 
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. 
The dependent variable in equation (2) is the annual change (denoted by Δ) in the 
logarithm of GDP per capita (y). Short-run or transitory associations are analyzed by 
using annual changes in the explanatory variables (X) used in Table 5.  Lags in these 
changes yield an indication of the medium run impact of such variables. We also include 
one lag of growth. Long-run relationships between output per capita are isolated in the 
error correction term in square brackets by including lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables and the level of the dependent variable (i.e., the lagged level of GDP per 
capita). The error term is a composite error term consisting of year dummies, country 
fixed effects and country-time idiosyncratic errors. 
The methods we use in this section are discussed theoretically in Pesaran and 
Smith (1995).
29 Our specification is comparable to that of Loayza and Ranciere (2005) 
who investigated the short and long-run impacts of financial development on growth. 
However, we did not find it feasible to allow for country specific short-run coefficients, 
so we assume slope homogeneity throughout. A benefit of the ARDL approach is that 
inclusion of sufficient lags of the variables of interest can mitigate endogeneity problems. 
We include one lag of the growth rate of GDP per capita, contemporaneous changes, and 
up to a second lag, in capital flows and for the crisis indicator up to two lags and the 
contemporaneous change. For other variables we only include the contemporaneous 
annual changes to conserve on degrees of freedom. Our results appear robust to 
alternative lag structures on the crisis and capital flows variables.  
  Table 6 shows our results for both periods. First, surges in capital inflows seem to 
raise output in the short term. In the first wave of globalization, permanent changes to 
                                                 
29 If there is a unique vector defining the long-run relationship between the variables and the lag orders are 
appropriately chosen, then the auto-regressive distributed lag model provides consistent estimates of the 
parameters, regardless if the variables are stationary only after first differencing. The ‘Nickell bias’ arises 
when the lagged dependent variable and the error term are correlated due to the inclusion of country fixed 
effects. The bias diminishes as the length of the panel increases. In our case, since we have over thirty years 
of observations, the bias is minimal. Other specifications such as the pooled mean group estimator and the 
mean group estimator would allow for heterogeneous dynamics. These specifications were infeasible so we 
report only the pooled dynamic fixed effects estimator which may contain bias is the adjustment coefficient 
vary by country.  
(2)  22 
capital inflows seem to raise output. In the second period, even after controlling for 
crises, they seem to be associated with slightly lower levels of output per capita.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  For both samples, crises bring output down but in different ways. In the first 
wave, crises seem to have a permanent negative effect on output.  In the latter period the 
onset of crises brings output down while recovery would be associated with a rise.
30 This 
is consistent with a phoenix type recovery. However, such catching up is not sustained 
long enough to fully recover to where the pre-existing trend would have taken a country 
in terms of levels. The evidence in the second period is that crises are associated with 
long-term loss in output equivalent to the original fall or on average 1.5%. In the first 
wave of globalization the permanent output losses are larger at about 4%.  
The point estimates on the other long-run coefficients roughly support the 
predictions of a human capital augmented neoclassical growth model. Overall, these 
models suggest, as before, that crises bring growth down in the short term and also lead 
to long-term output losses. Capital flows increase growth in the short-run but in the 
second period run they seem to be bring permanent output losses. We are somewhat 
sceptical of the latter finding. Perhaps this is evidence of the fact that relatively poor 
countries receive the largest capital inflows. But even here, this is at odds with findings 
from the recent period that capital has been flowing ‘uphill’. In any case, the connection 
between crises and growth and output losses comes out clearly in both periods of 
globalization. We now look at the impact of hard currency debt on overall economic 
performance via financial crises. 
 
5.4  The Quantitative Impact of Foreign Currency Debt on Growth 
 
The combined evidence from Tables 1 through 4 suggests that foreign currency 
debt, by triggering financial crises, could be responsible for significant temporary 
reductions in economic growth and permanent output losses arising from those crisis 
events. How much of a role does foreign currency debt play in all of this? We first look at 
                                                 
30 The change in the crisis indicator would be 1 in the first year of a crisis and -1 in the year after the crisis 
ends.  23 
the predicted probabilities of having a debt crisis at various values of fundamentals. We 
focus on debt crises since evidence is strongest here for the connection between such debt 
and crisis. 
In Table 2 we exhibit the predicted probabilities of debt crises based on the probit 
models of Table 1 columns 2 and 5. A country with “excellent fundamentals” would not 
have a crisis with predicted probability of 0.98 but would have a debt crisis with a 
predicted two percent chance.
31 Now look at the predicted values of growth, as a function 
of predicted crisis probabilities and using the following equation from our first set of 





where  () . Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal used in the 
probit model (i.e., the predicted probability of having a debt crisis at given levels of the 
covariates z and estimated coefficients) and the variables in X are the controls used in the 
growth regressions besides the crisis variable.  
Suppose a country has “excellent fundamentals” (n.b., this kind of country has 
100 percent hard currency debt). Using the estimated coefficient on the crisis variable,  
2 ˆ α , from column IV of Table 5 (i.e., the 1973-2003 period), and the predicted probability 
of a crisis from column 2 of Table 2, the contribution to the predicted growth rate from a 
crisis is a decline of 0.03 percentage points (-0.03 = -1.37*.02). In this case, hard 
currency debt hardly seems injurious.
32  
Next we look at how hard currency debt interacts with other control variables to 
form a volatile combination of fundamentals and low growth. A high ratio of hard 
currency debt to total debt, combined with poor fundamentals, is in fact associated with 
significantly lower growth.  
                                                 
31 This assumes one crisis per five year period that lasts one year. The effects will be larger if crises last 
longer or crises are serially correlated as the raw data suggest. 
32 Other covariates in the probit are defined at the sample means. 
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Consider a country with the “worst fundamentals.” In the first and second periods 
respectively, our models predict a loss in growth of just over two percentage points (-1.78 
= -2.84*0.63) and 0.28 percentage points (-0.28 = -1.37*0.21).  Both of these impacts are 
economically significant given mean growth rates of per capita income are 1.33 and 1.7 
in the respective time periods. 
Consider also a thought experiment that raises hard currency debt from 50 percent 
of the total to 100 percent of the total. Let fundamentals be the “worst” (i.e., hold reserves 
at zero, with the country experiencing a currency crisis this year and a banking crisis in 
the previous year). Next calculate the predicted probabilities of a debt crisis under these 
two debt ratios using the probit model of column V of Table 1. Finally use the 
coefficients on the crisis variable in the growth regressions of columns II and IV in Table 
5.  
In the case of this doubling of hard currency debt, we find the growth rate would 
drop by 0.91 percentage points in the first period and 0.28 percentage points in the 
second period.
33 A doubling of the reliance on hard currency debt when accompanied by 
weak fundamentals is associated with significant losses in economic growth although the 
impact is stronger in the first period of globalization. 
Another way of looking at this result is available. Between 1973 and 2003 a 
halving of the hard currency debt ratio, assuming “worst fundamentals”, could eliminate 
much of the reduction to expected growth we found above and which we attributed to 
hard currency debt. On the other hand, in the first wave of globalization, we find that 
such a reduction in the hard currency debt  ratio only eliminates half of the lower 
expected growth that arises from 100 percent hard currency debt. Even though the 
expected negative growth impact is lower in the second period, hard currency debt plays 
a much stronger role in accounting for the poor growth performance associated with 
crises in the second wave of globalization.  
Another thought experiment is to look at the long-run level effects implied by the 
results in Table 6. Here crises are associated with a long-run decline in the level of output 
                                                 
33 To arrive at this number, subtract the predicted probability of crisis with a 50 percent ratio of hard 
currency debt (0.31 or 0) from that when there is a 100 percent hard currency ratio (0.63 or 0.21). Then 
multiply this difference by the crisis coefficient in the growth regression (i.e. -2.84 or -1.37).  25 
per capita of 1.5 percent in the second period and 4 percent in the first period.
34 Suppose 
that a crisis event was a once in a lifetime event and that a country had the worst 
fundamentals. The expected present discounted value of the income losses, with a 
constant discount factor of 0.95 and assuming a loss of  $75 of income per year post-
crisis (roughly 4 percent and 1.5 percent less than the average income per capita in each 
respective sample) would be roughly $945 (i.e., 945 = [0.63*75] ÷.05) in the first wave 
and $315 (i.e., 315 = [.21*75] ÷ .05) in the second wave. As Ranciere and Tornell (2009) 
show, more information about the exact costs of crises and the level of completeness of 
financial markets would need to be known to make a more explicit welfare calculation, 
but these costs do not seem totally trivial. Moreover, many countries face an ongoing 
threat of crisis in subsequent years so that these costs can be compounded. The sample 
average for frequency of crises in Bordo and Meissner (2006) is 6 and 14 percent 
respectively. These imply crises every 16 or 7 years. The average person living 70 years 
in an economy exposed to such frequencies would see between 5 and 10 crises per 
lifetime. From an ex ante perspective, the costs indicated above could be increased 
significantly due to the fact that crises are recurring events in many emerging market 
economies. 
Our results from the second period generate a strong non-linearity in the debt 
crisis model (but not in the currency crisis model). With the worst fundamentals and a 50 
percent hard currency debt ratio, the predicted probability of a debt crisis is nearly zero. 
The predicted probabilities of a debt crisis do not rise above 0 until hard currency debt 
ratios rise above 90 percent. This is due to the fact that most countries have in fact had in 
the past 100 percent ratios of hard currency debt to total international debt and currency 
crisis before defaulting.  
We turn now to an out of sample forecast for Eastern Europe. The non-linearity 
above turns out to be somewhat crucial in understanding why our models predict that 
countries in Eastern Europe (in our subsample) should be relatively safe from a debt 
default associated with their foreign currency debt exposure. However, currency crises 
                                                 
34 Unreported regressions show that contrary to the theoretical argument in Ranciere and Tornell (2009) 
there is no evidence of higher growth rates associated with permanent rises in foreign financing.   26 
may be a problem and other systemic features of the international financial landscape 
may yet lead to a debt crisis outcome.  
 
6 Eastern Europe and the Global Credit Storm of 2008-2009. 
 
The outbreak of the global credit crunch in 2008 has put many countries in 
Eastern European on the radar screen of global capital market analysts looking for the 
next financial crisis. Significant  and persistent current account deficits since 1998 seen in 
Figure 2 are seen as one potential weakness. Commentators have also pointed out that 
national balance sheets are increasingly composed of foreign currency obligations. 
Households in Hungary are reported to have favored mortgages in Swiss francs due to the 
lower interest rates and overall foreign currency exposure of private borrowing may be 
up to 70 or 80 percent of all liabilities in Estonia and Latvia. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Optimists who would demonstrate that Eastern Europe is not likely to become the 
latest episode in the current global meltdown cite the fact that overall exposure by 
developing country creditors to Eastern Europe is relatively small as a percentage of 
source countries’ GDP. For this reason one potential channel for contagion or a self-
fulfilling blowout may be restricted since maximum losses should be relatively small. 
Sovereign debt is also not deemed to be excessive, and some countries as of 2008 have 
floating exchange rates (e.g., Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) which has dampened 
the build up of foreign currency liabilities as their currencies have slid and wobbled in the 
past two years. Slovakia has also just joined the Euro and so its currency mismatches may 
be more limited. Still, particular countries are on the shortlist for the next financial crisis 
headline due to their exchange rate policies and external debt positions. The Baltic 
nations and Bulgaria have intermediate to hard pegs for instance and significant foreign 
currency liabilities. Specific financial institutions based in Austria and Italy are cited as 
precariously exposed to Eastern Europe. This makes for the potential that eastern troubles 
inflict damage on western European economies as these losses get mopped up by 
domestic authorities via bailouts.  27 
 
6.1 Out of Sample Forecast: Is Foreign Currency Debt a Problem for Growth in the East? 
 
   Using recent data for 2008 and our models from Tables 1 and 5, we attempt to 
gauge the risk of  debt and currency crises in several Eastern European nations and the 
expected growth impact of such a crisis. Table 7 lists the values of explanatory variables 
inserted into the probit models of Table 1 for several Eastern European countries (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia), 
the predicted probability of a debt default and a currency crisis, the average growth rate 
of per capita GDP from 2003 to 2008, the expected reduction in growth in percentage 
points (equal to the growth losses of 1.37 percentage points from Table 5 multiplied by 
the predicted probability of having a debt crisis), and the expected loss relative to average 
growth between 2003-2008 in percentage terms. 
   Table 7 shows the forecast risks of debt crises are low and for currency crises the 
risks are moderate to low. In this way, expected growth should be near trend. What 
accounts for this rosy scenario?  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Since no country is reported to have above a 90 percent ratio of hard currency 
debt to total debt, predicted probabilities of debt crises are near zero.  Currency crises are 
predicted to be somewhat likely in the following countries: Bulgaria (0.04), Lithuania 
(0.04), Hungary (0.04), Estonia (0.07) and Latvia (0.09).
35 To the benefit of many of 
these countries, international interest rates are also much lower than their long-run 
average and reserve positions are fairly strong.  
Table 7 shows Estonia and Latvia are most at risk of a currency crisis and are 
consequently forecast to lose the most in terms of economic growth due to such a crisis.
36  
                                                 
35 The ratio of foreign currency debt to GDP is roughly 70 percent in Latvia and Estonia (Rosenberg, 2008). 
This could be cause for alarm as well. Also our earlier measure’s denominator was international liabilities. 
No evidence on the proportion of total foreign liabilities denominated in foreign currency was readily 
available. This is the measure used in the probit models of Table 1. If we assume that all foreign debts were 
denominated in foreign currency predicted probabilities would be: 0.13 (Czech Republic), 0.11 (Slovakia),  
0.12 (Poland), 0.18 (Romania), 0.2 (Bulgaria), 0.14 (Lithuania), 0.11(Hungary), .01(Estonia), 0.29 (Latvia). 
36 The Baltics seem intent on maintaining their pegs. Latvia has entered into an IMF program as of early 
2009 but has not been forced to devalue. Lithuania still is aiming to join the European Monetary Union in 
2010.  28 
These countries have the highest levels of foreign currency financing, have built up large 
negative international investment positions and have quasi-currency board systems that 
may not withstand the pressures of adjustment. Still, in expectation, growth rates should 
be down by less than 2 percent (not percentage points). 
The largest countries in this subsample, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland 
have low ratios of foreign currency debt to the total (c. 12-14%) and overall net external 
indebtedness is fairly low. All of these countries are also floating their currencies which 
may help speed the adjustment process. Indeed, Poland’s central bank was able to cut 
interest rates during the global crisis. Contrast this with the Baltic states where interest 
rates jumped upwards and liquidity disappeared. Floats may also have limited the amount 
of build-up of large foreign currency liabilities unlike in the Baltic countries where pegs 
have been the long-standing policy. It would appear that some of the larger countries 
examined here have learnt from the past by limiting currency mismatches and floating 
their exchange rates sufficiently to obviate moral hazard. Moreover, ECB and Federal 
Reserve monetary policies have been extremely loose which is contrary to previous 
events when center country interest rates in the 1980s and in the 1990s exacerbated 
financial stringency.  
Still, if the recent past has taught us anything, fundamentals are not the only factor 
in generating crises. Contagious spillovers and sudden stops of inflows, perhaps arising 
from margin calls on already weakened western European banks, are not fully accounted 
for in these models. Hence the likelihood of a crisis may be somewhat higher than is 




7. Conclusions and Comparisons over Two Periods of Financial Globalization: 
Implications for International Financial Architecture 
 
                                                 
37 As of 31July, 2009 Latvia, Hungary and Romania had turned to the IMF for financial support. Hungary 
however managed to place 1 billion euro in bonds after their original demand of 500 million was 
oversubscribed. It would appear that a credible commitment by the ECB and the fiscal authorities within 
the Eurozone has managed to help stabilize expectations in this region. Few emerging markets in the past 
have had such support in the midst of a systemic crisis.  29 
We have compared long-run associations of foreign currency debt with financial 
crises and economic growth in two periods, 1880-1913 and 1973-2003. We found strong 
evidence that both hard currency debts and capital inflows are associated with crises that 
lower growth temporarily and permanently reduce output compared to the long-run trend.  
The remedies and lessons from the East Asian and Latin American crises in the 
1990s have been either to reinforce domestic debt markets and reserves and to float or 
choose a hard peg and cope with hard currency debt.  Both options would diminish the 
currency mismatch. Globally, net foreign currency exposure has not been totally 
eliminated since 1997, but it appears to be declining. Indeed, the data show, and our 
model supports the idea that several eastern European countries have done much to 
mitigate the potential risks of crisis by limiting exposure to foreign currency debt. Still, 
the Baltic nations have not been so fortunate and have found the adjustment process 
extremely contractionary. International conditions and political forces may still result in a 
sudden stop, causing currencies to depreciate and a high risk of default.  
Our analysis also shows that hard currency debt is only a partial explanation of 
the risks of financial crisis. Countries in our sample have demonstrably been able to 
complement foreign currency debt with stronger financial development and a large 
reserve base to mitigate risks of major financial crises. The US, Australia, Canada and the 
Scandinavian countries had significant currency mismatches throughout the nineteenth 
century but avoided major economic disasters. Today a large set of small but developed 
countries (Iceland perhaps being an exception due in part to its lax financial regulation) 
appear to have done the same. 
Finally, although countries have now started to minimize currency mismatches, 
uneven development, mis-guided and unregulated credit booms, sudden stops and 
contagion continue to pose threats of crisis. In other words, reducing reliance on foreign 
currency debt has been one, albeit small, step towards improving international financial 
stability. However, remaining issues from the debate on international financial 
architecture include: establishing an international lender of last resort, balanced 
liberalizations in environments of best-practice financial regulation, sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanisms, and implementing standard accounting principles to increase 
transparency.   30 
Thus far, the credit crunch of 2008 and the ensuing financial turmoil have mainly 
affected high-income countries, but there are prospects for further turbulence in the 
developing world both immediately and in the future. As global capital flows – and their 
risks – remain prominent, the risks to stability arising from the absence of a durable and 
complete international financial architecture will likely become more evident . 
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 Data Appendix 
 
Most of the data underlying this paper was used in our previous work (Bordo and 
Meissner 2007a and 2007b and Bordo and Meissner 2006) and is explained thoroughly in 
those sources. The bulk of the macro historical data set is that used in Bordo et. al. 
(2001). Even more expansive data descriptions and sources are listed in the working 
paper versions of our earlier work on crises in NBER working papers 11173 and 11897 
and available upon request from the authors. 
Country Sample:  
Countries included in Empirical Samples, First Wave 
Set 1. Growth Regressions  n=19 countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, India Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russia, 
Sweden, Spain, United States.  
Set 2. Crisis Regressions  n=18, countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russia, 
Sweden, Spain, United States. 
 
 
Countries included in Empirical Samples, Second Wave 
Set 1. Growth Regressions  n=49, countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
Set 2. Crisis Regressions  n=45, countries include Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe 
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Crisis Dating: 
As in Bordo et. al ( 2001) we date currency and banking crises using both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. For all countries besides Austria-Hungary, Russia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Uruguay and India we have relied on the dates of 
Bordo et. al. in both periods. We have tried to date currency crises for the 19
th century, 
when possible, by using an approach based on the exchange market pressure (EMP) 
methodology which looks at changes in reserves, the exchange rate and the interest rate. 
Currency crises past 1997 have been updated using the dates from Kaminsky (2006). 
Banking crises are listed in Bordo et. al. and updated past 1997 from Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003). 
Debt crisis dates are based on Beim and Calomiris (2001). Only private lending to 
sovereign nations is considered when building those default dates. Not every instance of 
technical default is included in the chronology, the authors identified periods (six months 
or more) where all or part of interest/principal payments were suspended, reduced or 
rescheduled. Some of those episodes are outright debt repudiations, while others were 
reschedulings agreed upon mutually by lenders and borrowers. Additional data are from a 
spreadsheet underlying Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). Post-1997 we code the 




Our measure of international capital market integration for the 1880-1913 period 
is based on Stone’s (1999) total capital calls on the London market which includes public 
and private issues of debt purged of any refinancing issues.
38 The conventional wisdom 
for the period is that these gross flows were roughly equal to net flows for the capital 
importers (cf. Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
39   
                                                 
38 We also carried out tests (which are left unreported), using the current account relative to GDP as a 
measure of the net inflow or outflow of capital.  
39 The correlation between Stone’s flows and the current account deficits is 0.69.  33 
The data for 1973-2003 are based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). We use the 
change in the net economic position (NEP) as a measure of net inflows of foreign capital. 
 
Ratio of International Reserves to Money 
Source: International financial statistics IMF.  
 
Hard Currency Debt Ratios 
 
For the 1880-1913 period, we collected data from various national sources on 
hard currency debt for domestic governments (cf. Bordo and Meissner, 2007a) and 
augmented and compared this with similar data made available by Flandreau and Zúmer 
(2004). What we refer to as hard currency debt (or original sin) is debt that carried a gold 
clause or was made payable at a fixed rate in a foreign currency issued domestically or 
externally.








− = 0 ,
i country  by    issued   Securities
i country  by    i currency  in    issued   Securities
1 max i OS .  
 
 
For the current period we rely on data underlying Eichengreen, Hausman and Panizza 
(2005) and thank the authors for making these data available to us. These data reflect 
public and private obligations issued on external or international markets only and 
exclude domestic debt issues. Note that these data are within country averages for the 
period 1972-1997.  
 
Data for Table 7 
 
Foreign Currency Debt/Total Debt is calculated as the percentage of total household loans 
denominated in foreign currency as of January 2008. Source: Fitch Ratings see 
"Emerging Europe's  Current Account Deficits: Mind the Gap!" (2008);  
 
Short term interest rates are the yields on 6 month US treasury bills as of March 20, 
2009.  
                                                 
 
40 The data appendices and the text in our previous work on crises has more to say about the structure of 
this debt.   34 
 
Data on the net international investment position (NIIP) come from the statistical 
services and central banks of the respective countries listed in the table. The following 
applies: NIIP for Czech Republic is for June 2008 and June 2007; NIIP for Slovakia is 
year end 2007 and 2008. growth rate for GDP between 2007 and 2008 was extrapolated 
as 8 percent since final 2008 figures for GDP were not yet available. NIIP for Poland is 
for 2006 and 2007; NIIP for Romania is for year end 2007 and 2008; NIIP for Bulgaria is 
as of June 2007 and 2008; NIIP for Lithuania is as of year end 2007 and 2008; NIIP for 
Hungary is year end 2006 and 2007; NIIPs for Estonia and Latvia are year end 2007 and 
2008. 
 
The ratios of reserves/money come from International Financial Statistics January 2009 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Country specific notes:  
Czech Republic: Notes: Reserves and M2 as of Oct. 2008;  
Slovakia: Reserves and M2 as of August 2008; 
Poland: Reserves and M2 as of September 2008  
Romania:  Reserves, M2,as of October 2008;  
Bulgaria: Reserves, M2, as of October 2008;  
Lithuania: Reserves, money as of October 2008 
Hungary: Reserves, M2, exchange rate as of October 2008;  
Estonia: Reserves, M2, exchange rate as of October 2008;  
Latvia: Reserves, M2 exchange rates as of October 2008. 
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Sudden stop and/or 
current account reversal
(expected) currency depreciation
Pegged exchange rate fails
liability dollarization + depreciation =
more balance sheet deterioration
Lending dries up completely
Markets lose confidence 






- Low currency mismatch
- Lender of last resort 
- Deep financial markets 
- Credibility 
- Cooperation 
- Smaller financial frictions 
Investment maintained
`




Any or all maintain market confidence.
Turbulence ends.
Low original sin. 
Expansionary depreciation  41 
 


























































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country; Marginal effects of explanatory variables on 
the probability of a crisis are shown, not coefficients. Countries included in the first wave sample are 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Spain, United States. Countries included in the second wave sample are 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, ,Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, RB, Zimbabwe 
 
a – based on currency crisis sample 
Significance at * - p<0.10, ** - p<0.05, *** - p<0.01 
Table 1 Determinants of Financial Crises, Full Sample 
First Wave of Market Integration 
1880-1913 



















Lag of Level of Net 
Inflows/GDP 
0.003*** 
(0.001)  – 1.79  0.0018 
(0.0011)*  – 0.75 
Original Sin  -0.00008 
(0.00022) 
-0.00006 
(0.00005)  52.46  0.0013*** 
(0.00040) 
0.00054* 
(0.00016)  78.4 
Original Sin x Currency 





(0.0033)  5.69 
Lag of Short term real 





2.75  0.0031 
(0.0018) 
0.0025** 
(0.0011)  6.6 




48.46  -0.000053 
(0.000100) 
-0.000075 
(0.000069)  57.97 




(0.02)  0.05  0.054*** 
(0.024) 
0.014** 
(0.010)  0.12 
Currency Crisis  –  -0.003 
(0.005)  0.04 –  -0.029 
(0.041)   0.059 
          
Country-Years 508  508    1252  1252   
Countries 18  18    45  45   
Obs. P  0.04  0.012    0.06  0.03   
Pred. P (at x-bar)  0.03  0.005    0.04  0.01   
Pseudo-R
2 0.11  0.22    0.08  0.13    43 
 
Table 2 Likelihood of Debt Crises: First and Second Waves 
Pr(Debt Crisis) 




Scenario #1: Excellent Fundamentals 
Original Sin = 100 
Original Sin x Currency Crisis = 0 
Gold Coverage Ratio = Average 
Currency Crisis = 0 
Bank Crisis Last Year = 0 
<0.01 0.03 
Scenario #2: Good Fundamentals 
Original Sin = 100 
Original Sin x Currency Crisis = 100 
Gold Coverage Ratio = Average 
Currency Crisis = 1 
Bank Crisis Last Year = 0 
0.20 0.08 
Scenario #3: Bad Fundamentals 
Original Sin = 100 
Original Sin x Currency Crisis = 0 
Gold Coverage Ratio = 0 
Currency Crisis = 0 
  Bank Crisis Last Year = 1 
0.08 0.07 
Scenario #4:Worst Fundamentals 
Original Sin = 100 
Original Sin x Currency Crisis = 100 
Gold Coverage Ratio = 0 
Currency Crisis = 1 
Bank Crisis Last Year = 1 
0.63 0.18  44 
 
Notes: Estimation is by one-step maximum likelihood for probit models with endogenous regressors. Probit 
coefficients are shown. Excluded instruments for original sin in the first wave are the logarithm of GDP 
and an indicator for being in the British Empire. In the second wave the excluded instrument is the 
logarithm of GDP. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country; Countries included in the 
samples are those listed in Table 1.  
Significance at * - p<0.10, ** - p<0.05, *** - p<0.01 
Table 3 Determinants of Financial Crises, Instrumental Variables 
First Wave of Market Integration 
1880-1913 


















Lag of Level of Net 
Inflows/GDP 
0.06*** 
(0.02)  – 1.79  0.03** 
(0.01)  – 0.75 








(0.009)  78.4 
Original Sin x Currency 
Crisis  – –  – –  – – 
Lag of Short term real 





2.75  0.03 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02)  6.6 




48.46  -0.0009 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.002)  57.97 




(0.48)  0.05  0.59*** 
(0.13) 
0.21 
(0.18)  0.12 





(0.19)   0.059 
          
Country-Years 503  503    1252  1252   
Countries 18  18    45  45   
Wald test for exogeneity 
(p-value)  0.74 0.96   0.001*** 0.05**   
Chi-squared test for zero 
slopes (p-value)  0.000*** 0.04**    0.0001***  0.000***  
           45 
 
Notes: Estimation in columns (1) and (2) are probit models. Estimation in columns (4) and (5) are by one-
step maximum likelihood for probit models with endogenous regressors. The excluded instrument for 
original sin is the logarithm of GDP. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country; Countries 
included in the samples are those listed in Table 1 for the second wave with out the G-7 and Switzerland.  
Significance at * - p<0.10, ** - p<0.05, *** - p<0.01 
Table 4 Determinants of Financial Crises, Robustness to Sample Changes with and without Instrumental 
Variables, 1973-2003 
Dropping G-7 + Switzerland   Dropping G-7 + Switzerland  

















Lag of Level of Net 
Inflows/GDP 
0.002* 
(0.001)  – 0.97 0.02 
(0.01)*  – 0.97 








(0.02)  91.3 
Original Sin x Currency 
Crisis  – 
0.003 
 (0.005) 
6.8 –  – 6.8 
Lag of Short term real 





6.56  0.02 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.02)  6.56 




66.75  0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.001)  66.75 




(0.01)  0.14  0.6*** 
(0.15) 
0.13** 
(0.22)  0.14 





(0.19)  0.07 
          
Country-Years 1041  1041    1040  1040   
Countries 37  37    37  37   
Obs. P  0.07  0.03    –  –   
Pred. P (at x-bar)  0.06  0.02    –  –   
Pseudo-R
2 0.04  0.10    –  –   
Wald test for exogeneity 
(p-value)  – –   0.003***  0.12    46 
 
Notes: Country fixed effects models with robust standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses.
 Models for each wave include dummies for years 1880, 
1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1910 and 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, and 1998, 
respectively. ‡ - Average years of financial crisis is the average of the sum of 
dummies for whether a country experienced a currency, banking, or debt crisis. 
Hausman-Taylor χ
2 = 10.68 (p<0.56) and 45.95 (p<0.001)  for first and second 
waves respectively, favors fixed effects over random effects for second wave.  
Significance at * - p<0.10, ** - p<0.05, *** - p<0.01 
 
Table 5 International Financial Integration and Growth, Five Year Periods, 
1880-1910 and 1972-2003 
Dependent Variable: Average Five Year Percentage Growth Rate of GDP per 
Capita in non-overlapping periods 
First Wave of Market 
Integration 
1880-1910 




(I) (II) (III)  (IV) 


















































Ln GDP per capita in first 

















        
Mean Country Growth 












Number of country years  105  62  254  254 
Number of Countries  18  12  49  49 
R
2-within 0.26  0.43  0.30  0.33  47 
 
Notes: Country dynamic country fixed effects models with robust standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses. Dependent variable is the annual change in the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita. See text for more discussion.
 Models for each 
wave include time dummies. Short-run coefficients are for annual changes in the 
explanatory variables. Long-run coefficients are for levels of the variables. 
Significance at * - p<0.10, ** - p<0.05, *** - p<0.01 
Table 6 International Financial Integration, Crises and Growth, Long and Short-Run 
Impacts on Output per capita, 1880-1910 and 1972-2003 
 
First Wave of Market Integration 
1880-1913 
Second Wave of Market Integration  
1973-2003 
Covariates  Short Run 
Coefficients 
(Change in X) 
Long Run 
Coefficients 
(Levels of X) 
Short Run 
Coefficients 
(Change in X) 
Long Run 
Coefficients 
(Levels of X) 









Net Capital Inflows/GDP (t-1) 0.11 
(0.14)  –  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
– 
Net Capital Inflows/GDP (t-2)  – –  0.03** 
(0.01) 
– 









(0.01)  –  -0.006 
(0.004) 
– 
Crisis (t-2)   – –  0.001 
(0.003) 
– 
































Growth GDP  
per capita (t-1) 
-0.28 
(0.05)  –  0.1 
(0.05)* 
– 
GDP per capita (t-1) –  -0.03 
(0.06)   –  -0.05 
(0.01)*** 
        
Mean Country Growth Rate (% 



















0.18  48 
Table 7 Eastern Europe, Predicted Probabilities of Crises and Expected Growth Losses as of March, 2009 
 
Czech Republic Slovakia Poland Romania Bulgaria Lithuania Hungary Estonia Latvia
Capital Inflows/GDP (-1 x change in NIIP) 7.21 2.50 4.51 19.23 21.93 8.96 4.64 0.36 36.95
Foreign Currency Debt/Total Debt 12 14 22 53 55 58 62 78 85
Original Sin x Foreign Currency Debt/Total Debt 12 14 22 53 55 58 62 78 85
Short term interest rate  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.69
Reserves/M2 25.45 35.54 27.26 61.69 59.14 37.93 75.77 39.50 46.70
Banking Crisis (assumed) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Currency crisis (assumed) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Predicted probability of a debt crisis  <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
Predicted probability of a currency crisis  0.008 0.008 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09
Average growth rate GDP per capita 2003-2008 4.75 5.44 4.54 6.37 6.56 8.29 3.97 7.99 9.27
Expected growth loss = probability of DEBT crisis x -1.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expected growth loss = probability of CURRENCY crisis x -1.37 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12
    (percentage points)
Expected percentage drop in growth rate due to currency crisis -0.23 -0.20 -0.30 -0.65 -0.84 -0.66 -1.38 -1.20 -1.33
(Growth loss/Average Growth) 
Notes: See the data appendix for sources and definitions of variables. Predicted probabilities are based on probit models in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.
Original sin is calculated as the percentage of total household loans denominated in foreign currency as of January 2008. Source: Fitch Ratings see "Emerging Europe's  Current 
Account Deficits: Mind the Gap!" (2008); Short term interest rates are the yields on 6 month US treasury bills as of March 20, 2009.
Data on the net international investment position (NIIP) come from sources listed in the appendix.
The ratios of reserves/money come from International Financial Statistics January 2009 International Monetary Fund.
Czech Republic: Notes: Reserves and M2 as of Oct. 2008; Slovakia:Reserves and M2 as of August 2008; Poland; Reserves and M2 as of September 2008 
Romania  reserves, M2,as of October 2008; Bulgaria reserves, M2, as of October 2008; Lithuania reserves, money as of October 2008
Hungary reserves, M2, exchange rate as of October 2008; Estonia reserves, M2, exchange rate as of October 2008; Latvia reerves, M2 exchange rates as of October 2008